Riyadh Agreement Yemen 2019

An earlier version of this document was published on November 7, 2019 by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar. Opponents of the STC often reduce the group to a mere deputy from the United Arab Emirates, which continue to fund and support some of their political operations, but this does not allude to the public support that the STC has in its communities. The Hadi government and loyalists continue to ignore protests in the southern region in support of the STC and overplay those who support Hadi. Much of this propaganda undermines the prospects of a genuine implementation of an agreement. Moreover, the update of the STC does not bode well for Yemen, as it deepens political marginalization. In addition, the Hadi government cannot request the demilitarization of STC-allied forces because it is unable to protect the South from Houthi military incursions. Clashes persist with Houthi forces in Dhala and the Houthis have conducted drone strikes against targets in the South. Moreover, the lack of political representation and economic abuse, despite an abundance of resources in the South, is one of the STC`s biggest problems. The lack of understanding of the marginalization that affected the South after unification with the North in 1990 and the exploitation and repression that followed after the 1994 civil war widened the gap between communities and constituted a major mobilization for the cause of the South. These provisions address the second point of the agreement. Troops who have advanced towards Aden, Abyan and Shabwa since early August 2019 will return to their original positions and take their place within a fortnight of the signing of local security forces.

During the same period, military and security forces stationed in the city of Aden will be disarmed and deployed outside the city, under supervision and on the timetables set by the coalition. All government and STC troops inside Aden governorate will be transferred to camps outside the governorate, in accordance with the guidelines established by the coalition command. The only exception is the first presidential protection brigade, which will continue to protect the presidential palaces and their surroundings and guarantee the security of the presidential movement.